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In a seminal paper, Feldman and Micali show an n-party Byzantine agreement protocol in
the plain model that tolerates t < n/3 malicious parties and runs in expected constant
rounds. Here, resolving a question that had been open since their work, we show an
expected constant-round protocol for authenticated Byzantine agreement assuming honest
majority (i.e., t < n/2), and relying only on the existence of signature schemes and a public-
key infrastructure. Combined with existing results, this gives the ﬁrst expected constant-
round protocol for secure computation with honest majority in a point-to-point network
under the same assumptions. Our key technical tool — a new primitive we introduce called
moderated VSS — also yields a simpler proof of the Feldman–Micali result.
In addition, we show a simple technique for sequential composition of Byzantine
agreement protocols that do not achieve simultaneous termination, something that is
inherent for protocols using o(t) rounds.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
When designing cryptographic protocols, it is often convenient to abstract away various details of the underlying com-
munication network. As one noteworthy example, protocol designers frequently assume the existence of a broadcast channel
that allows any party to send the same message to all other parties (and all parties to be assured they have received iden-
tical messages) in a single round.2 With limited exceptions (e.g., in a small-scale wireless network), it is understood that
the protocol will be run in a network where only point-to-point communication is available and the parties will have to
“emulate” the broadcast channel by running a broadcast sub-protocol. Unfortunately, this “emulation” typically increases the
round complexity of the original protocol substantially.
Much work has therefore focused on reducing the round complexity of protocols for broadcast or the related task of
Byzantine agreement (BA) [35,39]; we survey this work in Section 1.2. As discussed there, a seminal result of Feldman and
Micali [20] is a protocol for n-party Byzantine agreement tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties and running in expected
constant rounds. This resilience is the best possible — regardless of round complexity — unless some set-up assumptions
are made. The most common assumption is the existence of a public-key infrastructure (PKI) such that each party Pi
has a public key pki for a digital signature scheme that is known to all other parties (a more formal deﬁnition is given
in Section 2); protocols in this model are termed authenticated. Authenticated broadcast protocols are known for t < n
✩ A preliminary version of this work appeared in Advances in Cryptology — Crypto 2006.
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and Garay [22] give an authenticated BA protocol that beats this bound for t < n/2, but their protocol relies on speciﬁc
number-theoretic assumptions; see Section 1.2 for further discussion.
1.1. Our contributions
As our main result, we extend the work of Feldman and Micali and show an authenticated BA protocol tolerating t < n/2
malicious parties and running in expected constant rounds. Our protocol assumes only the existence of signature schemes
and a PKI, and is secure against a rushing adversary who adaptively corrupts up to t parties. For those unfamiliar with the
speciﬁcs of the Feldman–Micali protocol, we stress that their approach does not extend to the case of t < n/2. In particular,
they rely on a primitive termed graded veriﬁable secret sharing (graded VSS) and construct this primitive using in an essential
way the fact that t < n/3. We take a different approach: we introduce a primitive called moderated VSS and use this to give
an entirely self-contained proof of our result.
We suggest that moderated VSS is a useful primitive in general, even when t < n/3. For one, moderated VSS seems easier
to construct: we show a generic construction of moderated VSS in the point-to-point model from any VSS protocol that relies
on a broadcast channel, while a direct construction of this sort for graded VSS is unknown. Perhaps more importantly,
moderated VSS provides what we believe to be a conceptually-simpler approach to the problem at hand: in addition to our
authenticated BA protocol for t < n/2, our techniques give a BA protocol (in the plain model) for t < n/3 whose concrete
round complexity is better than that of the Feldman–Micali protocol and whose proof is, in our opinion, signiﬁcantly simpler
than that of [20].
Since moderated VSS is impossible for t  n/2, our techniques do not extend to the case when there is no honest
majority. It remains an interesting open question as to whether it is possible to achieve broadcast for n/2 t < n in expected
constant rounds. See the recent work of Garay et al. [25] for some partial progress in this direction.
As mentioned earlier, cryptographic protocols are often designed under the assumption that a broadcast channel is avail-
able; when run in a point-to-point network, these protocols must “emulate” the broadcast channel by running a broadcast
protocol as a subroutine. If the original protocol uses multiple invocations of the broadcast channel, and these invocations
are each emulated using an o(t)-round broadcast protocol, diﬃculties related to the parallel and sequential composition4 of
the various broadcast sub-protocols arise; see the detailed discussion in Section 4. Parallel composition can be dealt with
using existing techniques [4,22]. There are also techniques available for handling sequential composition [4,37]; however,
these techniques apply only to the case t < n/3 [4] or are rather complex [37]. As an additional contribution of this work,
we show a method for sequential composition that applies when t < n/2 (assuming digital signatures and a PKI) and is
simpler and more round eﬃcient than prior work.
The above results, together with prior work [2,15], yield the ﬁrst expected constant-round protocol for secure compu-
tation in a point-to-point network that tolerates an adversary corrupting a minority of the parties and is based only on
the existence of one-way functions and a PKI. (A constant-round protocol of Goldwasser and Lindell [29], which does not
require a PKI, achieves a weaker notion of security that does not guarantee complete fairness or output delivery; see further
discussion in Section 4.3.)
1.2. Prior work on broadcast/Byzantine agreement
Deﬁnitions for broadcast and Byzantine agreement are given in Section 2. The problem of achieving broadcast makes
sense for any number of corrupted players, whereas Byzantine agreement is only well-deﬁned when t < n/2. It is easy to
see that for t < n/2 any Byzantine agreement protocol implies a broadcast protocol using one additional round: in the ﬁrst
round the dealer sends its input to all players, who then run a Byzantine agreement protocol on the values they received.
In a synchronous network with pairwise private, authenticated channels and no additional set-up assumptions, BA among
n parties is achievable if and only if the number of corrupted parties t satisﬁes t < n/3 [35,39]. (Unless otherwise stated, im-
possibility results hold even for computationally bounded adversaries while feasibility results hold even for computationally
unbounded adversaries.) Concerning round complexity, a lower bound of t + 1 rounds for any deterministic BA protocol is
known in this setting [21]. A protocol with this round complexity — but with exponential message complexity — was shown
by Pease et al. [35,39]. Following a long sequence of works, Garay and Moses [26] show a fully-polynomial, deterministic
BA protocol with optimal resilience and round complexity. Private channels are not assumed in these results.
To circumvent the above-mentioned lower bound on the round complexity, researchers beginning with Ben-Or [3] and
Rabin [41] explored the use of randomization. This line of research [8,12,17,19] culminated in the work of Feldman and
Micali [20], who show a randomized BA protocol with optimal resilience t < n/3 that runs in expected constant rounds.
3 Although Feldman and Micali claim an expected O (1)-round solution for t < n/2 in the conference version of their paper, this claim no longer appears
in either the journal version of their work or Feldman’s thesis [18].
4 These issues are unrelated to those considered in [36] where the different executions are oblivious of each other: here, there is a single “outer” protocol
scheduling all the broadcast sub-protocols. We do not consider concurrent composition since we are interested only in “stand-alone” security of the outer
protocol.
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see [6,30] for recent work showing o(t)-round randomized BA protocols without this assumption.
To achieve resilience t  n/3, additional assumptions are needed even if randomization is used. The most widely-used
assumptions are the existence of signatures and a public-key infrastructure (PKI); recall that protocols in this setting are
termed authenticated. When analyzing protocols in this model, signatures are assumed to be ideal in the sense that it is
simply assumed to be impossible for the adversary to forge signatures on behalf of honest parties. (For this reason, the ad-
versary may still be taken to be unbounded in the analysis and perfect security can be obtained.) These signatures can then
be instantiated using either cryptographically-secure digital signatures [42] to guarantee security against a computationally-
bounded adversary, or using information-theoretic “pseudo-signatures” [40] to obtain statistical5 security even against an
unbounded adversary. (As in the case of a PKI, the keying material needed for implementing pseudo-signatures is assumed
to be provided to the parties before the protocol begins.)
Pease et al. [35,39] show an authenticated broadcast protocol for t < n with exponential complexity. (Since signatures
are treated as ideal, it is meaningful to discuss protocols having exponential complexity. A secure realization of the protocol
then requires either information-theoretic pseudo-signatures, or cryptographic signatures secure against an exponential-time
adversary.) A fully-polynomial protocol with resilience t < n was given by Dolev and Strong [16]. These works do not require
private channels.
The (t + 1)-round lower bound for deterministic protocols holds in the authenticated setting as well [16], and the pro-
tocols of [16,35,39] meet this bound. (Although the setup phase and signature generation may be probabilistic, recall that
in the analysis signatures are treated as ideal and it is therefore still meaningful to talk of “deterministic protocols” in the
authenticated setting.) Some randomized protocols beating this bound for the case of n/3  t < n/2 are known [8,44,46],
but these are only partial results:
• Toueg [44] gives an expected O (1)-round protocol, but assumes a trusted dealer. Furthermore, after the dealing phase
the parties can only run the BA protocol a bounded number of times.
• A protocol by Bracha [8] implicitly requires a trusted dealer to ensure that parties agree on a “Bracha assignment” in
advance (see [19]). Furthermore, the protocol only achieves expected round complexity Θ(logn) and tolerates (slightly)
sub-optimal t  n/(2+ ) for any  > 0.
• Waidner [46], building on [8,19], shows that the dealer in Bracha’s protocol can be replaced by an Ω(t)-round
pre-processing phase during which a broadcast channel is assumed. The expected round complexity (after the pre-
processing) is also improved from Θ(logn) to Θ(1).
The latter two results assume private channels.
Fitzi and Garay [22], building on [9,38,44], give the ﬁrst full solution to this problem: that is, they show the ﬁrst au-
thenticated BA protocol with optimal resilience t < n/2 and expected constant round complexity that does not require any
trusted dealer or pre-processing (other than a PKI). Even assuming private channels, however, their protocol requires speciﬁc
number-theoretic assumptions (essentially, an appropriate type of homomorphic public-key encryption scheme) and cannot
be based on signatures alone. Because of its reliance on additional assumptions, the Fitzi–Garay protocol cannot be adapted
to the information-theoretic setting using pseudo-signatures.
2. Model and deﬁnitions
By a public-key infrastructure (PKI) in a network of n parties, we mean that all parties hold the same vector (pk1, . . . , pkn)
of public keys for a digital signature scheme, and each honest party Pi holds the honestly-generated secret key ski associated
with pki . Malicious parties may generate their keys arbitrarily, even dependent on keys of honest parties. We stress that the
vector of public keys is assumed to be ﬁxed before any execution of the protocol begins.
Our results are in the point-to-point model (unless otherwise stated), by which we mean the standard model in which
parties communicate in synchronous rounds using pairwise private and authenticated channels. Authenticated channels can
be realized using signature schemes and a PKI. (Note that signatures and a PKI are stronger than authenticated channels
since they allow third-party veriﬁability.) For static adversaries, private channels can be realized using one additional round
by having each party Pi send to each party P j a public key P Ki, j for a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme
(using a different key for each sender avoids issues of malleability). Of course, in the authenticated case such public keys
could also be included as part of the PKI. For adaptive adversaries, more complicated solutions are available [1,11] but we
do not discuss these further. For simplicity, we assume unconditional private/authenticated channels with the understanding
that these guarantees hold only computationally if the above techniques are used.
When we say a protocol (for Byzantine agreement, VSS, etc.) tolerates t malicious parties, we always mean that it
is secure against a rushing adversary who may adaptively corrupt up to t parties during execution of the protocol and
coordinate the actions of these parties as they deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary manner. Parties not corrupted by
5 Even if an authenticated protocol is proved to be perfectly secure when ideal signatures are available, it will in general only be statistically secure when
pseudo-signatures are used as there is always a non-zero probability that an adversary can forge an honest party’s signature.
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in the following way: For t < n/3 we allow a computationally-unbounded adversary (this is the unconditional case). For
t < n/2 we assume a PKI and an adversary who is computationally unbounded but is unable to forge signatures on behalf
of any honest party (this is the authenticated case). Using a standard hybrid argument and assuming the existence of digital
signatures, this implies that authenticated protocols are secure against computationally-bounded adversaries. Using pseudo-
signatures, authenticated protocols can be made secure even against a computationally-unbounded adversary (though in a
statistical, rather than perfect, sense).
When we describe signature computation in authenticated protocols we omit for simplicity additional information that
should be signed along with the message. That is, when we say that party Pi signs message m and sends it to P j , we
implicitly mean that Pi signs the concatenation of m with additional information such as: (1) the identity of the recipient
P j , (2) the current round number, (3) an identiﬁer for the message (in case multiple messages are sent to P j in the same
round); and (4) an identiﬁer for the (sub-)protocol (in case multiple sub-protocols are being run). This information is also
veriﬁed, as appropriate, when the signature is veriﬁed.
It can be veriﬁed by inspection that all protocols constructed in this work remain secure even when run in parallel
(in the authenticated case, we rely on the existence of distinct identiﬁers for each sub-protocol being run so as to avoid
the problems highlighted in [36]). One could also prove this formally by showing that each of our protocols realizes the
appropriate functionality within the UC framework [10]. Alternately, one could appeal to a recent result showing security of
statistically-secure protocols under parallel self composition when inputs are not chosen adaptively [34] (as will always be
the case in our work).
When we say that a party sends a message “to all other parties” we also treat this as if it sends the message to itself.
2.1. Broadcast and Byzantine agreement
Standard deﬁnitions of broadcast and Byzantine agreement (BA) follow.
Deﬁnition 1 (Broadcast). A protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer P∗ ∈ P holds an initial
input M , is a broadcast protocol tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at
most t parties:
Agreement. All honest parties output the same value.
Validity. If the dealer is honest, then all honest parties output M .
A broadcast channel refers to a physical implementation of broadcast; it can be viewed formally as a trusted party to
which all parties have access that implements the broadcast functionality as deﬁned above. A broadcast protocol can then
be viewed as a protocol that realizes a broadcast channel. These notions can be formalized in the setting of secure multi-
party computation by casting broadcast as a functionality (in the natural way) and then proving that any protocol realizing
the above deﬁnition serves as a secure implementation of the broadcast functionality. When a broadcast channel is used by
multiple parties (acting as dealers) in the same round, it is implicitly understood that rushing is always allowed and so the
message used by a dishonest dealer may depend on the messages used by honest dealers in the same round.
In this paper, we construct protocols for Byzantine agreement which readily imply protocols for broadcast.
Deﬁnition 2 (Byzantine agreement). A protocol for parties P1, . . . , Pn , where each party Pi holds initial input vi , is a Byzantine
agreement protocol tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at most t parties:
Agreement. All honest parties output the same value.
Validity. If all honest parties begin with the same input value v , then all honest parties output v .
If the {vi} are restricted to binary values, the protocol achieves binary Byzantine agreement.
In this work we construct randomized broadcast/BA protocols where termination is not guaranteed in any ﬁxed number
of rounds; i.e., for any r there is a non-zero probability that the protocol does not terminate in r rounds. Our protocols
do, however, eventually terminate with probability 1, in the sense that the probability of not terminating in r rounds ap-
proaches 0 as r tends to inﬁnity. We use the expected number of rounds to termination as our measure of round complexity,
but remark that our protocols (as in all previous work) achieve something stronger: they terminate in r rounds except with
probability 2−Θ(r) . In particular, the probability that an execution of the protocol exceeds ω(logk) rounds is negligible in k.
3. Byzantine agreement in expected constant rounds
In this section, we construct expected constant-round protocols for Byzantine agreement in both the unconditional
(t < n/3) and authenticated (t < n/2) settings. Our main result is the protocol for the case t < n/2 (which is the ﬁrst
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interesting as an illustration that our techniques yield a conceptually-simpler and more eﬃcient protocol in that setting as
compared to [20]. We develop both protocols in parallel so as to highlight the high-level similarities in each.
Notation. We use “=” to denote a test for equality, and “:=” to denote variable assignment. When we refer to an “honest
party” in our proofs and deﬁnitions, we mean a party that remains honest until the end of the protocol (or the correspond-
ing phase of the protocol, if the protocol concerned has multiple phases). This distinction is important to keep in mind since
we consider adaptive adversaries who may corrupt players in the middle of the protocol execution.
3.1. Basic primitives
We begin by reviewing the notions of gradecast and VSS:
Gradecast. Gradecast, a relaxed version of broadcast, was introduced by Feldman and Micali [20]; we provide a deﬁnition
which is weaker than theirs but suﬃces for our purposes. (In contrast to [20, Deﬁnition 11], our deﬁnition provides no
guarantees even if every honest party Pi outputs gi = 1.)
Deﬁnition 3 (Gradecast). A protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer P∗ ∈ P holds an initial
input M , is a gradecast protocol tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at
most t parties:
• Each honest party Pi outputs a message mi and a grade gi ∈ {0,1,2}.
• If the dealer is honest, then the output of every honest party Pi satisﬁes mi = M and gi = 2.
• If there exists an honest party Pi who outputs a message mi and the grade gi = 2, then the output of every honest
party P j satisﬁes mj =mi and g j  1.
When we refer to a gradecast channel we mean a trusted party that implements gradecast as deﬁned above. (Formally,
a dishonest dealer is allowed to specify the outputs of all the honest parties in an arbitrary manner, subject to the restric-
tions of the above deﬁnition; an honest dealer would always elect to have all parties output (M,2).) When a gradecast
channel is used by multiple parties (acting as dealers) in the same round, it is implicitly understood that rushing is always
allowed and so the message used by a dishonest dealer may depend on the messages used by honest dealers in the same
round.
The following result is due to [20] and proved for completeness in Appendix A.1:
Lemma 1. There exists a constant-round gradecast protocol tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties.
We next prove an analogue of the above for the case of authenticated gradecast.
Lemma 2. There exists a constant-round authenticated gradecast protocol tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties.
Proof. The following protocol is adapted from the work of Fitzi and Maurer [24], who were concerned with a different
setting than we are here.
Round 1. The dealer computes a signature σ of M and sends (M, σ ) to all parties.
Round 2. Let (Mi, σi) be the message received by party Pi (from the dealer) in the previous round. If σi is a valid signature
of Mi (with respect to the dealer’s public key), then Pi sends (Mi, σi) to all other parties; otherwise Pi sets Mi :=⊥
and sends nothing.
Round 3. Let (M j,i, σ j,i) be the message received by Pi (if any) from P j in the previous round. If there exists a j such that
M j,i = Mi but σ j,i is a valid signature of M j,i (with respect to the dealer’s public key), then Pi sets Mi :=⊥.
If Mi =⊥, then Pi computes a signature σ ′i of Mi and sends (Mi, σ ′i ) to all parties. (If Mi =⊥, then Pi sends nothing.)
Round 4. Let (M ′j,i, σ
′
j,i) be the message received by Pi (if any) from P j in the previous round. If there exist  n/2 distinct
indices j1, . . . , j and an M∗ such that M ′j1,i = · · · = M ′j,i = M∗ and σ ′jk,i is a valid signature of M∗ (with respect to
the public key of P jk ) for 1 k , then Pi sends (M∗, j1, σ ′j1,i, . . . , j,σ
′
j,i
) to all other parties and outputs mi := M∗ ,
gi := 2.
Output determination. Assuming Pi has not decided on its output, it proceeds as follows: If in the previous round Pi
received any message (M∗, j1, σ ′1, . . . , j,σ ′) for which  n/2, the { jk}k=1 are distinct, and σ ′k is a valid signature of
M∗ with respect to the public key of party P jk for 1 k  , then Pi outputs mi := M∗ , gi := 1. Otherwise, Pi outputs
mi :=⊥, gi := 0.
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a signature σ ′i of the dealer’s message M and sends (M, σ
′
i ) to all other parties. Thus, all honest parties will receive at least
n/2 correct signatures on M in round 3, and every honest party Pi will output mi = M , gi = 2 in round 4.
Before proving the second required property, we ﬁrst show that no two honest parties Pi, P j send messages (Mi, σ ′i ) and
(M j, σ ′j) in round 3 with Mi = M j . To see this, note that in round 3 Mi (resp., M j) is either equal to ⊥ or to the message
sent by the dealer to Pi (resp., P j) in the ﬁrst round. So if the dealer sent a valid signature on the same message to parties
Pi, P j in the ﬁrst round, the claim is obviously true. On the other hand, in any other case at least one of Pi, P j will not
send any message at all in round 3 (as at least one of Mi =⊥ or M j =⊥ will then hold).
Say a value M∗ is certiﬁed if an honest player holds (M∗, j1, σ ′1, . . . , j,σ ′) with  n/2, distinct { jk}k=1, and σ ′k a valid
signature of M∗ with respect to the public key of party P jk for 1  k  . Note that any certiﬁed value was signed by at
least one honest party. Since any honest parties who sign a message in round 3 sign the same message, as argued in the
previous paragraph, it follows that at most one value is certiﬁed.
Now, say there is an honest party Pi who outputs some message mi and gi = 2. It follows easily that any honest party
P j who did not output g j = 2 immediately in round 4 will output g j = 1 (and hence we have g j  1). Since, as we have
just argued, at most one value can be certiﬁed, it follows that all honest parties output mi . 
Veriﬁable Secret Sharing (VSS). VSS [13] extends the concept of secret sharing [7,43] in the sense that it considers the
presence of malicious, rather than just honest-but-curious, parties.
Deﬁnition 4 (Veriﬁable secret sharing). A two-phase protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished dealer
P∗ ∈ P holds initial input s, is a VSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adver-
sary controlling at most t parties:
Validity. Each honest party Pi outputs a value si at the end of the second phase (the reconstruction phase). Furthermore, if
the dealer is honest then si = s.
Secrecy. If the dealer is honest during the ﬁrst phase (the sharing phase), then at the end of this phase the joint view of the
malicious parties is independent of the dealer’s input s.
Reconstruction. At the end of the sharing phase the joint view of the honest parties deﬁnes a value s′ (which can be
computed in polynomial time from this view) such that all honest parties will output s′ at the end of the reconstruction
phase.
Note that, by deﬁnition, VSS is not possible when t  n/2.
The ﬁrst result that follows is well-known; the second is not explicit in the literature but follows readily from known
results. For completeness, proofs appear in Appendices A.2 and A.3.
Lemma 3. There exists a constant-round VSS protocol tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties, and relying on a broadcast channel during
the sharing phase only.
Lemma 4. There exists a constant-round authenticated VSS protocol tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties, and relying on a broadcast
channel during the sharing phase only.
3.2. Moderated VSS
We introduce a variant of VSS called moderated VSS, in which there is a distinguished party (who may be identical to the
dealer) called the moderator. Roughly speaking, the moderator “simulates” a broadcast channel for the other parties during
the sharing phase. At the end of the sharing phase, parties output a boolean ﬂag indicating whether or not they trust the
moderator. If the moderator is honest, all honest parties set this ﬂag to 1. Furthermore, if any honest party sets this ﬂag
to 1 then the protocol achieves all the properties of VSS (cf. Deﬁnition 4). A formal deﬁnition follows.
Deﬁnition 5 (Moderated VSS). A two-phase protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where there is a distinguished dealer
P∗ ∈ P who holds an initial input s and a moderator P∗∗ ∈ P (who may possibly be the dealer), is a moderated VSS protocol
tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at most t parties:
• Each honest party Pi outputs a bit f i at the end of the ﬁrst phase (called the sharing phase), and a value si at the end
of the second phase (called the reconstruction phase).
• If the moderator is honest during the sharing phase, then each honest party Pi outputs f i = 1 at the end of this phase.
• If there exists an honest party Pi who outputs f i = 1 at the end of the sharing phase, then the protocol achieves VSS;
speciﬁcally: (1) if the dealer is honest then all honest parties output s at the end of the reconstruction phase, and the
joint view of all the malicious parties at the end of the sharing phase is independent of s, and (2) the joint view of the
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output s′ at the end of the reconstruction phase.
We stress that if all honest parties Pi output f i = 0 at the end of the sharing phase, then no guarantees are provided;
e.g., honest parties may output different values at the end of the reconstruction phase, or the malicious parties may learn
the dealer’s secret in the sharing phase.
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 5. Assume there exists a constant-round VSS protocol Π , using a broadcast channel in the sharing phase only, tolerating
t < n/2 malicious parties. Then there exists a constant-round moderated VSS protocol Π ′ , using a gradecast channel, tolerating t
malicious parties.
Proof. We show how to “compile” Π so as to obtain the desired Π ′ . Essentially, Π ′ is constructed by replacing each
broadcast in Π with two invocations of gradecast: one by the party who is supposed to broadcast the message, and one by
the moderator P∗∗ . In more detail, Π ′ is deﬁned as follows: At the beginning of the protocol, all parties set their ﬂag f to 1.
The parties then run an execution of Π . When a party P is directed by Π to send message m to P ′ , it simply sends this
message. When a party P is directed by Π to broadcast a message m, the parties run the following “broadcast emulation”
subroutine:
1. P gradecasts the message m.
2. The moderator P∗∗ gradecasts the message it output in the previous step.
3. Let (mi, gi) and (m′i, g
′
i) be the outputs of party Pi in steps 1 and 2, respectively. Within the underlying execution of
Π , party Pi will use m′i as the message “broadcast” by P .
4. Furthermore, Pi sets f i := 0 if either (or both) of the following conditions hold: (1) g′i = 2, or (2) m′i =mi and gi = 2.
Party Pi outputs f i at the end of the sharing phase, and outputs whatever it is directed to output by Π at the end of the
reconstruction phase.
We now prove that Π ′ is a moderated VSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties. We ﬁrst show that if the moderator
is honest during the sharing phase then no honest party Pi ever sets f i := 0. To see this, note that if P∗∗ is honest then
g′i = 2 each time the broadcast emulation subroutine is executed. Furthermore, if Pi outputs some mi and gi = 2 in step 1
of that subroutine then, by deﬁnition of gradecast, P∗∗ also outputs mi in step 1. Hence m′i =mi and f i remains 1.
To show the second required property of moderated VSS, consider any execution of the broadcast emulation subroutine.
We show that if there exists an honest party Pi who holds f i = 1 upon completion of that subroutine, then the functionality
of broadcast was achieved (in that execution of the subroutine). It follows that if Pi holds f i = 1 at the end of the sharing
phase, then Π ′ provided a faithful execution of all broadcasts in Π and so the functionality of VSS is achieved.
If Pi holds f i = 1, then g′i = 2. (For the remainder of this paragraph, all variables are local to a particular execution of
the broadcast subroutine.) Since g′i = 2, the properties of gradecast imply that any honest party P j holds m′j = m′i and so
all honest parties agree on the message that was “broadcast.” Furthermore, if the “dealer” P (in the broadcast emulation
subroutine) is honest then gi = 2 and mi is equal to the dealer’s intended message m. So the fact that f i = 1 means that
m′i =mi =m, and so all honest parties use the message m “broadcast” by P in their underlying execution of Π . 
The transformation used in the proof of the preceding theorem does not apply to VSS protocols that use broadcast in the
reconstruction phase. We did not attempt to extend the theorem to such protocols since we do not need such an extension
for our results.
By applying the above theorem to the VSS protocol of Lemma 3 (resp., the authenticated VSS protocol of Lemma 4) and
then using the gradecast protocol of Lemma 1 (resp., the authenticated gradecast protocol of Lemma 2) to instantiate6 the
gradecast channel, we obtain:
Corollary 6. There exists a constant-round protocol for moderated VSS (in the point-to-point model) tolerating t < n/3 malicious
parties.
Corollary 7. There exists a constant-round protocol for authenticated moderated VSS (in the point-to-point model) tolerating t < n/2
malicious parties.
Moderated VSS vs. graded VSS. We brieﬂy discuss the differences between moderated VSS and graded VSS (the key com-
ponent in the Feldman–Micali protocol [20]). We ﬁrst quickly recall the deﬁnition of graded VSS. Like VSS, graded VSS has
6 It is important here for the claimed round complexity that multiple executions of gradecast, with different parties acting as dealer, can be run in
parallel. One can easily verify that this is the case for the protocols presented here.
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{0,1,2}. A graded VSS protocol satisﬁes the following three requirements:
• If the dealer is honest, then all honest parties output grade 2.
• If there exists an honest party that outputs a grade  1, then graded VSS achieves VSS.
• If there exists an honest party that outputs grade 2, then all honest parties output a grade  1.
Essentially, the grade output by a party in graded VSS indicates the extent to which the party “trusts” the dealer. In
moderated VSS we shift this determination of “trust” in the dealer to a determination of “trust” in a (possibly) different
party, the moderator. This conceptual separation is the key to our simpler construction of a BA protocol for t < n/3, as well
as our construction of an authenticated BA protocol for t < n/2.
Feldman and Micali construct a constant-round graded VSS protocol for t < n/3 based on the VSS protocol of Ben-Or
et al. [5] by replacing each invocation of broadcast in the underlying VSS protocol by a gradecast. The grade output in the
graded VSS protocol by each honest party is then determined as a (complicated) function of the grades received in each
individual gradecast. It is not clear how a constant-round protocol for graded VSS could be constructed directly for t < n/2
(though it appears that one could be constructed from a moderated VSS protocol with the same threshold), or how such a
protocol could be used to construct a constant-round BA protocol for the same threshold of malicious parties.
3.3. From moderated VSS to oblivious leader election
In this section, we construct an oblivious leader election (OLE) protocol based on any moderated VSS protocol. The
following deﬁnition of oblivious leader election is adapted from [22]:
Deﬁnition 6 (Oblivious leader election). A two-phase protocol for parties P1, . . . , Pn is an oblivious leader election protocol with
fairness δ tolerating t malicious parties if each honest party Pi outputs a value vi ∈ [n] at the end of the second phase, and the
following condition holds with probability at least δ (over random coins of the honest parties) for any adversary controlling
at most t parties:
There exists a j ∈ [n] such that (1) each honest party Pi outputs vi = j, and (2) P j was honest at the end of the ﬁrst
phase.7
If the above event happens, then we say an honest leader was elected.
It may seem counter-intuitive that OLE can be useful in the presence of an adaptive adversary who can anyway corrupt
the leader as soon as the leader is elected. In our application of OLE, however, each party will send some value to all other
parties prior to the second phase of OLE. Then, after completion of the second phase of OLE, all parties use the value that
was sent previously by the elected leader. Since all parties have already sent their values prior to completion of the ﬁrst
phase, it does not matter whether the leader is subsequently corrupted after completion of the second phase.
Our construction of OLE uses a similar high-level approach as in the construction of an oblivious common coin from
graded VSS [20]. However, we introduce different machinery and start from moderated VSS. Intuitively, a random coin
c j ∈ [n4] is generated for each party P j . This is done by having each party Pi select a random contribution ci, j ∈ [n4],
and then this value is shared using moderated VSS with P j acting as moderator. The ci, j are later reconstructed and c j is
computed as c j :=∑i ci, j mod n4. An honest party then outputs j minimizing c j . Since moderated VSS (instead of VSS) is
used, each party Pk may have a different view regarding the {c j}. However:
• If P j is honest then (by the properties of moderated VSS) all honest parties reconstruct the same values ci, j (for any i)
and hence compute an identical value for c j .
• If P j is dishonest but there exists an honest party Pi such that Pi outputs f i = 1 in all invocations of moderated VSS
where P j acts as the moderator, then (by the properties of moderated VSS) all honest parties compute an identical
value for c j .
Relying on the above observations, we devise a way such that all honest parties output the same j (such that P j is further-
more honest) with constant probability.
Theorem 8. Assume there exists a constant-round moderated VSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties. Then there exists a constant-
round OLE protocol with fairness δ = n−tn − 1n2 tolerating t malicious parties. Speciﬁcally, if n 3 and t < n/2 then δ  1/2.
7 Note that we cannot simply require that P j is honest since an adaptive adversary can always corrupt the leader once it has been elected. It is also for
this reason that we separate the protocol into two phases (if a non-adaptive adversary is considered, the conceptual separation of the protocol into two
phases is not necessary).
J. Katz, C.-Y. Koo / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 75 (2009) 91–112 99Proof. An OLE protocol follows. Each Pi begins with trusti, j = 1 for j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Then:
Phase 1. Each party Pi chooses random ci, j ∈ [n4] for 1  j  n. The following is executed n2 times in parallel for each
ordered pair (i, j):
All parties execute the sharing phase of a moderated VSS protocol in which Pi acts as the dealer with initial input
ci, j , and P j acts as the moderator. If a party Pk outputs fk = 0 in this execution, then Pk sets trustk, j := 0.
Upon completion of the above, let trustk
def= { j: trustk, j = 1}.
Phase 2. The reconstruction phase of the moderated VSS protocol is run n2 times in parallel to reconstruct the secrets
previously shared. Let cki, j denote Pk ’s view of the value of ci, j . (If a reconstructed value lies outside [n4], then cki, j is
assigned some default value in the correct range.) Each party Pk sets ckj :=
∑n
i=1 cki, j mod n
4, and outputs j ∈ trustk that
minimizes ckj .
We prove that the protocol satisﬁes Deﬁnition 6. Following execution of the above, deﬁne:
trusted def= { j: there exists a Pk that was honest at the end of phase 1 for which j ∈ trustk}.
It is immediate that if P j was honest in phase 1, then j ∈ trustk for all honest Pk (and hence j ∈ trusted). Furthermore, the
following hold by the properties of moderated VSS:
1. If j ∈ trusted, then for any honest Pk, Pk′ and any 1  n, we have ck, j = ck
′
, j and hence c
k
j = ck
′
j ; thus, we may freely
omit the superscript in this case.
2. If j ∈ trusted and Pi is honest, then ci, j is independent of the view of the malicious parties at the end of phase 1.
We next claim that for j ∈ trusted the coin c j is uniformly distributed in [n4]. To see this, let
c′j =
∑
: P malicious in phase 1
c, j mod n
4 and c′′j =
∑
: P honest in phase 1
c, j mod n
4.
(The former is the contribution to c j by the parties that are malicious in phase 1; the latter is the contribution to c j by the
parties that are honest in phase 1.) Since j ∈ trusted, the properties of VSS hold for the {c,k}n=1 and thus c′j is well-deﬁned
at the end of phase 1; moreover, by the second property noted earlier, c′′j is independent of the view of the malicious parties
at the end of phase 1. Because c′′j is uniform in [n4], it follows that c j = c′j + c′′j mod n4 is uniformly distributed in [n4].
By the union bound, with probability at least 1 − 1
n2
all coins {c j: j ∈ trusted} are distinct. Conditioned on this event,
with probability at least n−tn the party with the minimum c j among the set trusted corresponds to a party that was honest
in phase 1. This concludes the proof. 
Combining Theorem 8 with Corollaries 6 and 7, we obtain:
Corollary 9. There exists a constant-round protocol for OLE with fairness 2/3 tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties. (Note that when
n < 4 the result is trivially true.)
Corollary 10. There exists a constant-round protocol for authenticated OLE with fairness 1/2 tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties.
(Note that when n < 3 the result is trivially true.)
3.4. From OLE to Byzantine agreement
For the unauthenticated case (i.e., t < n/3), Feldman and Micali [20] show how to construct an expected constant-round
binary Byzantine agreement protocol based on any constant-round oblivious common coin protocol. We construct a more
round-eﬃcient protocol based on oblivious leader election. (Another advantage is that this approach allows us to handle
parallel composition more easily; see Section 4.) This also serves as a warmup for the authenticated case.
Theorem 11. If there exists a constant-round OLE protocol with fairness δ = Ω(1) tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties, then there
exists an expected constant-round binary Byzantine agreement protocol tolerating t malicious parties.
Proof. We describe a protocol for binary Byzantine agreement, assuming the existence of an OLE protocol with constant
fairness tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties. Each party Pi uses local variables bi ∈ {0,1} (which is initially Pi ’s input),
updatei (initially set to true), and exitBAi (initially set to false). At a high level, the parties run the following six
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bi to the value sent by the leader elected in that iteration, and the variable exitBAi indicates whether Pi should terminate
at the end of the current iteration.
Step 1. Each Pi sends bi to all parties. Let b j,i be the bit Pi receives from P j . (When this step is run at the outset of the
protocol, a default value is used if Pi does not receive anything from P j . In subsequent iterations, if Pi does not receive
anything from P j then Pi leaves b j,i unchanged.)
Step 2. Each party Pi sets Sbi := { j: b j,i = b} for b ∈ {0,1}. If |S0i | t + 1, then Pi sets bi := 0. If |S0i | n − t , then Pi sets
exitBAi := true.
Each Pi sends bi to all parties. If Pi receives a bit from P j , then Pi sets b j,i to that value; otherwise, b j,i remains
unchanged.
Step 3. Each party Pi deﬁnes Sbi as in step 2. If |S1i | t + 1, then Pi sets bi := 1. If |S1i | n − t , then Pi sets exitBAi :=
true.
Each Pi sends bi to all parties. If Pi receives a bit from P j , then Pi sets b j,i to that value; otherwise, b j,i remains
unchanged.
If exitBAi = true, then Pi sets updatei := false.
Step 4. Each party Pi deﬁnes Sbi as in step 2. If |S0i | t + 1, then Pi sets bi := 0. If |S0i | n − t , then Pi sets updatei :=
false.
Each Pi sends bi to all parties. If Pi receives a bit from P j , then Pi sets b j,i to that value; otherwise, b j,i remains
unchanged.
Step 5. Each party Pi deﬁnes Sbi as in step 2. If |S1i | t + 1, then Pi sets bi := 1. If |S1i | n − t , then Pi sets updatei :=
false.
Each Pi sends bi to all parties. If Pi receives a bit from P j , then Pi sets b j,i to that value; otherwise, b j,i remains
unchanged.
Step 6. All parties execute the OLE protocol; let i be the output of Pi . Each Pi does the following: if updatei = true,
then Pi sets bi := bi ,i . If exitBAi = true, then Pi outputs bi and terminates; otherwise, Pi goes to step 1.
First we claim that if an honest Pi sets exitBAi := true in step 2 or 3 of some iteration, then all honest parties P j hold
b j = bi by the end of step 3 of that same iteration. Consider the case when Pi sets exitBAi := true in step 2. (The case
when Pi sets exitBAi := true in step 3 is exactly analogous.) This implies that |S0i | n− t and hence |S0j | n−2t  t+1
and b j = 0 by the end of step 2. Since this holds for all honest players P j , it follows that in step 3 we have |S1j | t and so
b j remains 0.
Next, we show that if — immediately prior to any given iteration — no honest parties have terminated and there exists
a bit b such that bi = b for all honest Pi , then by the end of step 3 of that iteration all honest parties Pi hold bi = b and
exitBAi = true. Consider the case b = 0 (the case b = 1 is exactly analogous). In this case |S0i |  n − t in step 2 for
any honest Pi . Thus, any honest Pi sets exitBAi := true and holds bi = 0 by the end of this step. As in the previous
paragraph, in step 3 the value of bi remains 0.
Arguing exactly as in the previous two paragraphs, one can similarly show: (i) if — immediately prior to any given
iteration — there exists a bit b such that bi = b for all honest Pi , then by the end of step 5 of that iteration all honest parties
Pi hold bi = b, exitBAi = true, and updatei = false (and hence all active, honest parties output b and terminate the
protocol in that iteration). (ii) If an honest party Pi sets exitBAi := true in some iteration, then all honest parties P j hold
b j = bi and update j = false by the end of step 5 of that iteration. (iii) If an honest party Pi sets updatei := false
in some iteration, then all honest parties P j hold b j = bi by the end of step 5 of that same iteration. Note that validity is
implied by (i).
We next show that if an honest party Pi outputs bi = b (and terminates) in some iteration, then all honest parties output
b and terminate by the end of the next iteration. To see this, note that if Pi terminates in some iteration then it must have
set exitBA := true in that same iteration; by (ii) every honest party P j holds b j = b at the end of that iteration, and
sends b j = b to all other parties in step 5. (Thus, even if P j terminates in that iteration, P j can be viewed as continuing to
send b j = b in the following iteration.) So by (i), all honest parties who have not yet terminated will output b at the end of
the next iteration.
Finally, we show that if an honest leader8 P is elected in step 6 of some iteration, then all honest parties Pi terminate
by the end of the next iteration. By (i), it is suﬃcient to show that, by the end of that iteration, there exists a b with
bi = b for all honest Pi . If all honest P j hold update j = true then this is immediate (since all honest parties then set
bi := b,i = b , using the fact that P was honest in step 5). Otherwise, say honest Pi holds updatei = false. By (iii),
b = bi at the end of step 5, and hence all honest parties P j have b j = bi by the end of step 6.
If the OLE protocol elects an honest leader with constant probability, it follows that the above protocol is an expected
constant-round binary Byzantine agreement protocol. 
8 This implies that P was uncorrupted in step 5 of the iteration in question.
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protocol using two additional rounds [45]. Parallel composition (see Section 4) can also be used to achieve the same result
without using any additional rounds. Using either approach in combination with the above and Corollary 9, we have:
Corollary 12. There exists an expected constant-round protocol for Byzantine agreement (and hence also broadcast) tolerating t < n/3
malicious parties.
For the authenticated case (i.e., t < n/2), Fitzi and Garay [22] construct a binary Byzantine agreement protocol based on
OLE; however, they do not explicitly describe how to achieve termination. We construct a multi-valued Byzantine agreement
protocol based on OLE and explicitly show how to achieve termination. In the proof below, we assume the existence of a
gradecast channel for simplicity of exposition; in Section 5.2, we improve the round complexity of our protocol by working
directly in the point-to-point model.
Theorem 13. If there exists a constant-round authenticated OLE protocol with fairness δ = Ω(1) tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties,
then there exists an expected constant-round authenticated Byzantine agreement protocol, assuming a gradecast channel, tolerating t
malicious parties.
Proof. Let V be the domain of possible input values, let the input value for party Pi be vi ∈ V , and let φ ∈ V be some
default value. Each Pi begins with an internal variable locki set to ∞.
Step 1. Each Pi gradecasts vi . Let (v j,i, g j,i) be the output of Pi in the gradecast by P j .
Step 2. For any v such that v = v j,i for some j, party Pi sets S vi := { j: v j,i = v ∧ g j,i = 2} and S˜ vi := { j: v j,i = v ∧ g j,i  1}.
If locki = ∞, then:
1. If there exists a v such that |S˜ vi | > n/2, then set vi := v; otherwise, set vi := φ.
2. If |S vii | > n/2, then set locki := 1.
Step 3. Each Pi gradecasts vi . Let (v j,i, g j,i) be the output of Pi in the gradecast by P j .
Step 4. For any v such that v = v j,i for some j, party Pi deﬁnes S vi and S˜ vi as in step 2. If locki = ∞, then:
• If there exists a v such that |S˜ vi | > n/2, then set vi := v; otherwise, set vi := φ.
Pi sends vi to all parties. Let v∗j,i be the value Pi receives from P j .
Step 5. All parties execute the OLE protocol; let i be the output of Pi .
Step 6. Each Pi does the following: if locki = ∞ and |S vii | n/2, then set vi := v∗i ,i .
Step 7. If locki = 0, then Pi outputs vi and terminates the protocol. If locki = 1, then Pi sets locki := 0 and goes to
step 1. If locki = ∞, then Pi goes to step 1.
We refer an execution of steps 1 through 7 as an iteration. An easy observation is that once an honest party Pi holds
locki = ∞, then (assuming Pi remains honest) vi is unchanged for the remainder of the protocol and Pi terminates with
output vi by (at latest) the end of the following iteration. We ﬁrst claim that if — immediately prior to any given iteration —
there exists a value v such that vi = v for all honest Pi and no honest parties have yet terminated, then all honest parties
will terminate and output v by the end of the following iteration. (This in particular proves validity.) To see this, note that
in this case all honest parties gradecast v in step 1. By the properties of gradecast, all honest parties will be in S vi and S˜ vi
for any honest Pi . It follows that vi = v and locki = ∞ for all honest Pi after step 2. The observation mentioned earlier
shows that all honest parties will terminate within at most one additional iteration with output v , as desired.
Now consider the ﬁrst iteration in which an honest party Pi sets locki := 1 (in step 2), and let v def= vi . We claim
that, by the end of that iteration, v j = v for all honest P j and no honest parties will have yet terminated. The claim
regarding termination is immediate since honest parties do not terminate until the iteration following the one in which
they set lock := 1 (and we are considering the ﬁrst such iteration). As for the ﬁrst property, note that by the properties of
gradecast S vi ⊆ S˜ vj . Since Pi set locki := 1 we know that |S˜ vj | |S vi | > n/2 and so P j sets v j = v after step 2. Since this
holds for all honest parties, every honest party gradecasts v in step 3 and thus |S vj | > n/2 in step 4. It follows that v j = v
at the end of that iteration.
Combining the above arguments, it follows that if an honest Pi sets locki := 1 in some iteration I , then v j = vi for all
honest P j at the end of iteration I; all honest P j have lock j = ∞ by the end of iteration I + 1; and all honest parties will
have terminated with identical outputs by the end of iteration I + 2.
We next show that if an honest leader9 P is elected in some iteration then all honest Pi hold the same value v by
the end of that iteration. By what we have argued above, it suﬃces to consider the case where locki = ∞ for all honest
parties Pi after step 2. If in step 6 all honest Pi have |S vii | n/2, it follows easily that each honest Pi sets vi := v∗,i = v
9 This implies in particular that P was uncorrupted in step 4 of the iteration in question.
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there exists an honest party Pi such that |S vii | > n/2 in step 6. Consider any other honest party P j :
• If |S v jj | > n/2, then S vii ∩ S
v j
j = ∅ and (by properties of gradecast) v j = vi .
• If |S v jj | n/2, then P j sets v j := v∗, j . But, by properties of gradecast, S vii ⊆ S˜ vi and so P set v := vi in step 4 (since
P was honest at that point). Hence P j sets v j := v∗, j = v = vi .
If the OLE protocol elects an honest leader with constant probability, it follows that the above protocol terminates in
expected constant rounds. 
Combining Lemma 2, Corollary 10, and Theorem 13 we obtain our main result:
Corollary 14. There exists an expected constant-round protocol for authenticated Byzantine agreement (and hence also for authenti-
cated broadcast) tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties.
Exact round complexities. In Section 5, we compute the exact round complexities of our protocols for BA and authenticated
BA (after applying some optimizations). We also show ways of reducing the amortized round complexities when multiple
(sequential) executions of our protocols are run; this is important when they are used as subroutines to implement a
broadcast channel within some larger protocol (cf. the discussion on sequential composition in the following section).
Communication complexity and computational overhead. In what follows, we estimate the communication complexities
of our protocols, as well as the number of signature computations required in the authenticated case. As the focus of this
work was on round complexity, we did not make any attempt to improve or optimize these results.
Unconditional case. The gradecast protocol given in Appendix A.1 has total communication complexity O (n2|M|) to grade-
cast a message of length |M|. The communication complexity of moderated VSS, as given by applying Theorem 5 to
the VSS protocol from Appendix A.2, is O (n4|s|) to share a secret of length |s|. Oblivious leader election requires O (n2)
invocations of moderated VSS, where a secret of length O (logn) is shared, for a total communication complexity of
O (n6 logn). This dominates the cost of each iteration of the binary Byzantine agreement protocol described in Theo-
rem 11; since an expected constant number of iterations are run, the expected communication complexity is O (n6 logn).
Multi-valued Byzantine agreement on a value of length |M| can be obtained using only O (n2|M|) additional communi-
cation [45].
Authenticated case. Let k denote the length of a signature. The gradecast protocol given in the proof of Lemma 2 has total
communication complexity O (n2|M| + n3(k + logn)) to gradecast a message of length |M|. Furthermore, in total O (n)
signatures are generated and O (n2) signatures are veriﬁed. The communication complexity of moderated VSS, as given
by applying Theorem 5 to the VSS protocol from Appendix A.3, is O (n4 · (|s| + k + logn)) for sharing a secret of length
|s|. Furthermore, a total of O (n2) signatures are generated and O (n3) signatures are veriﬁed. Oblivious leader election
requires O (n2) invocations of moderated VSS, where a secret of length O (logn) is shared, for a total communication
complexity of O (n6 · (k + logn)), along with O (n4) signature computations and O (n5) signature veriﬁcations.
The cost of each iteration of the Byzantine agreement protocol described in Theorem 13 is dominated by the oblivious
leader election and gradecast subroutines. Thus, the expected communication complexity is O (n3|M| + n6 · (k + logn))
for agreement on a value of length |M|, while there are O (n4) signature computations and O (n5) signature veriﬁcations.
In Section 5.2 we show a Byzantine agreement protocol with expected communication complexity O (n2|M| + n6 · (k +
logn)) (and the same number of signature computations as above).
4. Parallel and sequential composition
4.1. Composition of broadcast subroutines
Suppose we are given an n-party protocol Π that is designed under the assumption that a broadcast channel exists.
Without loss of generality, assume that every party broadcasts in every round of Π . (We stress, however, that rushing is
allowed and so the message broadcast by a dishonest party in a given round may depend on the messages broadcast by
the honest parties in that round.) We would like to compile Π so as to obtain a protocol Π ′ running in a point-to-point
network, with only an expected constant multiplicative increase in the round complexity. The naive way to do this is to
simply replace every execution of broadcast in Π with an execution of an expected constant-round broadcast protocol bc.
There are, however, two subtle problems with this approach:
Parallel composition. Although the expected round complexity of any single execution of bc is constant, the expected
number of rounds needed for n parallel executions of bc to all terminate may no longer be constant.
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inherent for any broadcast protocol using o(t) rounds.) The lack of simultaneous termination may cause problems for
subsequent executions of bc, since all honest parties may not begin running some subsequent execution of bc in the
same round. It may also cause problems for messages sent as part of Π itself.
The problem of parallel composition is rather easy to deal with. A general technique for handling this issue is proposed
by [4], though their solution is somewhat complicated. For the speciﬁc broadcast protocol developed here, however, we may
rely on an idea of Fitzi and Garay [22] that applies to any broadcast protocol based on oblivious leader election (as ours are).
The main idea is that when multiple broadcast subroutines are run in parallel, only a single leader election (per iteration) is
required for all these subroutines. Using this approach, the expected round complexity for n parallel executions is identical
to the expected round complexity of a single execution.
In what follows, then, we will assume we have an expected constant-round protocol pbc achieving parallel broadcast,
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 7 (Parallel broadcast). A protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where each party Pi holds an initial input Mi , is a
parallel broadcast protocol tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at most t
parties:
Functionality. Each honest party P j outputs a vector of values (m
j
1, . . . ,m
j
n).
Agreement. All honest parties output the same vector.
Validity. If Pi and P j are any two honest parties, then m
j
i = Mi .
We stress that “parallel broadcast” is not the same as “simultaneous broadcast” [31], since the latter requires indepen-
dence of the messages used by the different parties.
4.2. Sequential composition
We have already noted that certain diﬃculties arise due to sequential composition of protocols without simultaneous
termination (see also [37]). As an example of what can go wrong, assume some protocol Π (that relies on a broadcast
channel) requires all parties to broadcast messages in rounds 1 and 2. Let pbc1,pbc2 denote the corresponding invocations
of parallel broadcast within the composed protocol Πpbc (which runs in a point-to-point network, and in which each
invocation of parallel broadcast is emulated by running a parallel broadcast protocol pbc). Then, because honest parties in
pbc1 do not terminate in the same round, honest parties may begin execution of pbc2 in different rounds. But security of
pbc2 is no longer guaranteed in this case!
Of course, one way to deal with this issue is to design protocols that use broadcast in only a single round; see [32,33] for
work in this direction. In this section, however, we focus on general techniques that can be applied to arbitrary protocols
(that may use broadcast in multiple rounds).
Existing methods for dealing with sequential composition of protocols without simultaneous termination either apply
only in the case t < n/3 [4] or are rather ineﬃcient [37]. We show here a more eﬃcient way to deal with the problem that
applies for t < n/2.
Let rc(Π) denote the (expected) round complexity of a protocol Π .10 We also deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 8. A protocol Π has staggering gap g = gap(Π) if any honest parties Pi , P j are guaranteed to terminate Π within
g rounds of each other.
We now prove the following:
Lemma 15. Let pbc be a parallel broadcast protocol tolerating t malicious parties. Then for any constant c  0 there is a parallel
broadcast protocol Expandc(pbc) tolerating t malicious parties as long as all honest parties begin execution of Expandc(pbc) within c
rounds of each other. The staggering gap of Expandc(pbc) is 1 (as long as all honest parties begin execution within c rounds of each
other), and furthermore
rc
(
Expandc(pbc)
)
 (2c + 1) · rc(pbc) + c + 2,
where the round complexity (when honest parties begin within c rounds of each other) is measured from the initiation of the ﬁrst
honest party until the termination of the last honest party.
This result holds unconditionally for the case of t < n/3, and under the assumption of a PKI and digital signatures for t < n/2.
10 The round complexity of a run of a protocol is the round in which the last honest player terminates.
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1. Pk sends nothing for the ﬁrst c rounds of its activation.
2. In round c + 1, party Pk sends its 1st-round message of pbc.
Deﬁne ri
def= c + 1+ (i − 1) · (2c + 1). In general, Pk sends its ith-round message of pbc in round ri .
3. Round-i messages received from other parties are accepted only if they arrive in the (2c + 1)-round interval between
rounds ri − c and ri + c, inclusive. If a message is not received from some party in that interval, a default message is
used on behalf of that party instead.
Observe that when Pk is supposed to send its ith-round message of pbc, it has already determined the incoming
(i − 1)th-round messages of all other parties.
4. When Pk terminates execution of pbc with output a vector v , it sends “exit, v” to all parties, along with a signature
of this message in the authenticated case. It does not yet terminate execution of Expandc(pbc); see the continuation of
the protocol below.
(The ﬁrst 3 steps of the above are similar, but not identical, to the approach of [37, Lemma 3.1].) In addition to the above,
the following is done in parallel at every round:
Unconditional case. If there is a v such that Pk has received “exit, v” from t + 1 distinct parties, then Pk sends “exit, v” to
all parties (assuming it has not sent such a message already).
If Pk has received “exit, v” from 2t + 1 distinct parties, then it terminates immediately with output v .
Authenticated case. If there is a v such that Pk has received valid signatures from t + 1 distinct parties on “exit, v ,” then
Pk forwards “exit, v” along with these t + 1 signatures to all parties and terminates immediately with output v .
We prove that Expandc(pbc) achieves parallel broadcast as long as all honest parties begin within c rounds of each
other. As in [37], all honest parties will accept the pbc-messages of all other honest parties. Furthermore, for any j > i it
is impossible for the adversary to make any of its round-i messages of pbc depend on the round- j message of pbc sent by
any honest party. To see this, say the earliest round- j message of pbc sent by any honest party occurs in round R . Then all
honest parties will send their round- j messages by round R + c at the latest, and so send their round-i messages by round
R + c − (2c + 1) = R − c − 1 at the latest. But this means that the last round in which any honest party accepts a round-i
message on behalf of any other party is round R − 1. Taken together, this proves that the execution of pbc taking place still
achieves the properties of Deﬁnition 7 as long as all honest parties start within c rounds of each other.
We are not yet done proving correctness of Expandc(pbc) since honest parties may terminate Expandc(pbc) without
terminating their local copy of pbc. Nevertheless, it is clear that all honest parties output the same value of v . Furthermore,
no honest party terminates Expandc(pbc) until some honest party has terminated its local copy of pbc. By what we have said
in the previous paragraph, the output of any honest party who runs pbc to completion will satisfy the validity condition of
Deﬁnition 7. It follows that the output of all honest parties in Expandc(pbc) will satisfy the validity condition. This proves
that Expandc(pbc) achieves parallel broadcast.
We next prove that the staggering gap of Expandc(pbc) is 1.
Unconditional case. Let R denote the ﬁrst round in which some honest party Pi terminates Expandc(pbc) with output v .
So by round R , party Pi has received 2t + 1 copies of “exit, v ,” at least t + 1 of which are from honest parties. Hence
all honest parties have received at least t + 1 copies of “exit, v” by round R and send (or have already sent) “exit, v”
by round R + 1. Since there are at least 2t + 1 honest parties, it follows that all honest parties receive 2t + 1 copies of
“exit, v” (and hence terminate Expandc(pbc)) by round R + 1.
Authenticated case. Let R denote the ﬁrst round by which some honest party Pi has received t + 1 valid signatures on
“exit, v .” Then Pi forwards these signatures to all other parties (and terminates) in round R + 1. It follows that all
honest parties will terminate by round R + 2 at the latest.
An execution of Expandc(pbc) terminates at latest by two rounds after the last honest party completes its execution of pbc.
If a given execution of pbc takes  rounds, this translates to a round complexity of (2c + 1) ·  + 2 for the corresponding
execution of Expandc(pbc). The stated round complexity takes into account the fact one honest party may have begun c
rounds after another. 
Unlike the analogous result in [37], Lemma 15 does not apply to arbitrary protocols (rather, we have explicitly stated the
lemma only for protocols achieving parallel broadcast) since the proof uses the fact that all honest parties should terminate
with identical outputs.
To see how Lemma 15 can be applied to the problem of sequential composition, suppose we have a protocol Π (relying
on a broadcast channel) that has ﬁxed round complexity  = rc(Π) and uses parallel broadcast in each round. Say we want
to instantiate the  invocations of parallel broadcast using sequential composition of protocols pbc1, . . . ,pbc , each having
staggering gap g . (We also assume that the point-to-point round-i messages of Π are sent as part of the ﬁrst round pbci .)
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relying on the fact that honest parties start pbc′1 in the same round.) Letting Π ′ denote the resulting protocol, we have:
Claim 16. Protocol Π ′ in the point-to-point model achieves the same security guarantees as Π in the broadcast model. (Formally, we
mean this as in [37, Lemma 3.1(1)].) The expected round complexity of Π ′ is O ( · rc(pbc)). In particular, if Π is a constant-round
protocol and pbc is an expected constant-round broadcast protocol, then Π ′ runs in an expected constant number of rounds.
Proof. We argue security of Π ′ as follows. We ﬁrst prove by induction that, for all i, all honest parties begin execution
of pbc′i within one round of each other. For i = 1 this is immediate. Assuming it is true for i, Lemma 15 guarantees that
all honest parties terminate pbc′i within one round of each other. But then all honest parties will begin pbc
′
i+1 within one
round of each other.
Since all honest parties begin execution of pbc′i within one round of each other, Lemma 15 ensures that each execution
of pbc′i is secure in the sense of Deﬁnition 7.
The only thing left to argue is that no dishonest party can cause its messages in the ith round of Π (whether these are
broadcast messages or point-to-point messages) to depend on the messages of any honest party in the jth round of Π , for
any j > i. (It is not a problem if the round-i message of a dishonest party depends on a round-i message of an honest party,
since we allow rushing when considering the security of Π .) Assume for simplicity that i = j − 1 (the argument extends
easily to the general case). Consider an honest party Pk who begins running pbc′j in some round R . At this point the output
of Pk in pbc′i is determined and hence, since pbc
′
i achieves parallel broadcast, the broadcast messages of all the dishonest
parties corresponding to the ith round of Π are already ﬁxed. As for point-to-point messages of Π , note that Pk does not
send any messages as part of pbc′j until round R + 1. Furthermore, since Pk terminated pbc′i in round R − 1, all honest
parties terminate pbc′i by round R at the latest. It follows that no honest party will accept any round-i messages in the
underlying protocol Π once any honest party sends its round- j message of Π . 
4.3. Secure multiparty computation in expected constant rounds
Beaver et al. [2] and Damgård and Ishai [15] show computationally-secure constant-round protocols for secure multi-
party computation tolerating dishonest minority, assuming the existence of one-way functions, private and authenticated
point-to-point channels, and a broadcast channel. (The solution of [15] is secure against an adaptive adversary.) We can
obtain an expected constant-round protocol Π ′ in the point-to-point model (assuming one-way functions and a PKI) using
the approach outlined in the previous section. (In fact, we can avoid the issue of sequential composition altogether by
relying on subsequent work [32] which shows a constant-round protocol for secure computation that uses broadcast in only
a single round.)
Theorem 17. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, for every probabilistic polynomial-time functionality f there exists an
expected constant-round protocol for computing f in a point-to-point network of private and authenticated channels assuming a PKI.
The protocol is computationally securewithout abort, and tolerates t < n/2 adaptive corruptions.
Security without abort is the standard notion of security in the case of honest majority; see [28]. Roughly speaking,
this deﬁnition implies the usual security guarantees of privacy and correctness, and additionally guarantees that all honest
parties always receive their output. In contrast, a constant-round protocol given by Goldwasser and Lindell [29] guarantees
privacy and correctness, but does not guarantee output delivery (namely, some honest parties may not receive any output),
fairness (namely, the adversary may receive output even though honest parties do not), or “unanimity” (namely, some
honest parties may receive their output while others do not).
5. Exact round complexities
In this section, we compute the exact round complexities of our broadcast/Byzantine agreement protocols, applying in
the process some optimizations. We also discuss the round complexities for multiple sequential invocations of our protocols,
relying on the results stated in Section 4.
5.1. The unconditional case (t < n/3)
Let us examine the Byzantine agreement protocol BA given in the proof of Theorem 11. Recall that BA consists of
multiple iterations; steps 1–5 of each iteration require only one round each, while in step 6 of an iteration the two phases
of an OLE protocol are run. Taking the OLE protocol from the proof of Theorem 8, note that the second phase of that OLE
protocol takes only a single round. Letting r denote the round complexity of the ﬁrst phase of the underlying OLE protocol,
we see that the round complexity of a single iteration of BA is 5+ r + 1 = 6+ r. Multiplying this by the expected number
of iterations yields the expected round complexity of BA.
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of step 6, and in particular can be carried out in parallel with steps 1–5. (A similar observation was made in [18].) Even
more, we can run multiple invocations of the ﬁrst phase of the OLE protocol and “save them” until needed. Applying these
ideas, we obtain the following protocol for Byzantine agreement (r again denotes the round complexity of the ﬁrst phase of
the underlying OLE protocol, and we assume r  5):
1. Run 
def= r/6 parallel executions of the ﬁrst phase of the OLE protocol. These are scheduled so that the ﬁnal 5 rounds
coincide with steps 1–5 of the ﬁrst iteration of BA.
2. For the remainder of the protocol, continually run  parallel executions of the ﬁrst phase of the OLE protocol in parallel
with the “main” protocol. These parallel executions will terminate every r rounds, just as the  previous executions get
“used up.”
To compute the resulting (expected) round complexity of the Byzantine agreement protocol, recall that an honest leader
is elected with probability at least 2/3 in each iteration, and when an honest leader is elected all honest parties terminate
by the following iteration. The expected number of iterations until a leader is elected is therefore at most (2/3)−1 = 3/2,
and the expected number of iterations is at most 5/2. Each iteration requires 6 rounds. Furthermore, we have an additional
r−5 rounds during which the initial  executions of the ﬁrst phase of the OLE protocol are run (recall that the ﬁnal 5 rounds
of these initial  executions coincide with the ﬁrst 5 rounds of the ﬁrst iteration). We thus obtain that the expected round
complexity of BA is at most:
6 · 5
2
+ (r − 5) = 10+ r.
Starting with the VSS protocol of [33], converting it to a moderated VSS protocol using Theorem 5, and then constructing
an OLE protocol as described in Theorem 8 (using the 3-round gradecast protocol from Appendix A.1), we obtain an OLE
protocol with r = 8. The expected round complexity of the Byzantine agreement protocol constructed in this work, then, is
at most 10 + 8 = 18. Broadcast can be implemented in the same number of rounds by having the dealer send its message
to all parties during the ﬁrst round of the initial executions of OLE.
5.2. The authenticated case (t < n/2)
Improved round complexity for authenticated BA. We start by constructing an authenticated Byzantine agreement protocol
directly from OLE in the point-to-point model (rather than relying on an underlying gradecast protocol as in Theorem 13).
Essentially, this protocol is obtained from the protocol described in the proof of Theorem 13 by unrolling the gradecast
protocol and eliminating redundant steps.
Let V be the domain of possible inputs, let the input value for party Pi be vi ∈ V , let φ ∈ V be some default value and
let ⊥ /∈ V . We say that Pi has a (valid) certiﬁcate for v if v ∈ V and there exist k > n/2 distinct indices j1, . . . , jk such that
Pi holds σ j1,i, . . . , σ jk,i which are valid signatures on v with respect to the public keys of P j1 , . . . , P jk . In this case, we will
also call (v, j1, . . . , jk, σ j1,i, . . . , σ jk,i) the certiﬁcate for v .
Each Pi begins with an internal variable locki set to ∞. To avoid having to say this every time, we impose the implicit
requirement that if locki = ∞ then the value of vi is “locked” and remains unchanged (i.e., even if the protocol description
below says to change it).
Step 1. Party Pi computes a signature σi of vi and sends (vi, σi) to all parties.
Step 2. Let (v j,i, σ j,i) be the message received by party Pi from P j . If these messages yield a certiﬁcate for vi , then Pi
sends a certiﬁcate for vi to all parties. Otherwise Pi sends nothing and sets vi :=⊥.
Step 3. If in the previous round Pi received a valid certiﬁcate for some v∗ = vi , then Pi sets vi :=⊥.
If vi =⊥, then Pi computes a signature11 σ ′i of vi and sends (vi, σ ′i ) to all parties.
Step 4. Let (v j,i, σ ′j,i) be the message received by party Pi from P j (if any) in the previous round. If these messages yield a
certiﬁcate for vi , then Pi sends a certiﬁcate for vi to all parties and sets locki := 1; otherwise Pi sends nothing and
sets vi :=⊥.
Step 5. If in the previous round Pi received a valid certiﬁcate on some value v∗ , then Pi sends a certiﬁcate on v∗ to all
parties and sets vi := v∗ . Otherwise, Pi sends nothing and sets vi :=⊥.
Step 6. If in the previous round Pi received a valid certiﬁcate on some value v∗ , then Pi sends v∗ to all parties; otherwise,
Pi sends ⊥ to all parties. Let v∗j,i be the value Pi received from P j in this round.
Step 7. All parties execute the OLE protocol; let i be the output of Pi . If vi =⊥ and v∗i ,i =⊥, then Pi sets vi := v∗i ,i . If
vi = v∗i ,i =⊥, then Pi sets vi := φ. If locki = 0, then Pi outputs vi and terminates the protocol. If locki = 1, then Pi
sets locki := 0 and goes to step 1. If locki = ∞, then Pi goes to step 1.
11 The current round number is also signed to distinguish this signature from others.
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parties. Then the above protocol is an expected constant-round authenticated Byzantine agreement protocol tolerating t malicious
parties.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 13. We refer to an execution of steps 1 through 7 as an iteration.
One can check by inspection that if — immediately prior to any given iteration — there exists a value v such that vi = v for
all honest Pi and no honest parties have yet terminated, then all honest parties will terminate and output v by the end of
the following iteration. (This in particular proves validity.)
An easy observation is that at any given step there is at most one value v ∈ V for which some honest party has a
certiﬁcate on v (otherwise, some honest party must have signed two different values; but this cannot occur). Now consider
the ﬁrst iteration in which an honest party Pi sets locki := 1 (in step 4). We claim that, by the end of that iteration,
v j = vi for all honest P j and no honest parties will have yet terminated. The claim regarding termination is immediate.
From the above observation, any honest party P j setting lock j := 1 in this iteration must also hold v j = vi . For an honest
party P j holding lock j = ∞ after step 4, since Pi sends a certiﬁcate for vi to all parties (in step 4) the earlier observation
again implies that P j sets v j := vi in step 5. Since v j = vi =⊥ (else Pi would not have set locki := 1), P j will not change
the value of v j in step 7. This establishes the claim, and implies that if any honest party terminates then all honest parties
terminate with the same output.
To complete the proof, we show that if an honest leader P is elected in some iteration then all honest parties will
hold the same value v by the end of that iteration. By what we have argued in the previous paragraph, we only need to
consider the case where locki = ∞ for all honest Pi in step 7. If vi =⊥ for all honest Pi by the end of step 5, the claim is
immediate since every honest Pi will change their value of vi to the honest leader’s value (or φ, as appropriate) in step 7.
Otherwise, vi =⊥ by the end of step 5 for some honest party Pi . Arguing as before, we see that every honest party P j
holds v j ∈ {vi,⊥} by the end of step 5. Furthermore, P receives a valid certiﬁcate on vi from Pi in step 5 and so sends
v∗ = vi to all parties in step 6. Hence every honest party P j holds v j = vi by the end of that iteration. 
Exact round complexity. We now compute the exact round complexity of the above protocol. An honest leader is elected
with probability at least 1/2 in each iteration, and all honest parties terminate by two iterations following the one in which
an honest leader is elected. The expected number of iterations is therefore at most (1/2)−1 + 2 = 4. Each iteration requires
7 rounds. As in the previous section, we can improve the round complexity by using an additional r − 6 rounds before the
ﬁrst iteration begins to run r/7 executions of the ﬁrst phase of OLE (and then continuing to run OLE in parallel with the
remainder of the protocol). Doing so, the expected round complexity is at most:
7 · 4+ (r − 6) = 22+ r.
Starting with the authenticated VSS protocol described in Appendix A.3, converting it to an authenticated moderated
VSS protocol using Theorem 5, and then constructing an authenticated OLE protocol as described in Theorem 8 (using the
4-round gradecast protocol from Lemma 2), we obtain an authenticated OLE protocol with r = 34. The expected round
complexity of the authenticated Byzantine agreement protocol constructed in this work, then, is at most 22 + 34 = 56.
Broadcast can be implemented in the same number of rounds by having the dealer send its message to all parties during
the initial executions of OLE.
5.3. Amortized round complexity of sequential broadcasts
We focus now on broadcast, rather than Byzantine agreement. The observation here is that when running multiple
sequential executions of broadcast, we no longer need to count the rounds for the initial “set-up” phase (in which the
ﬁrst phase of OLE is run) each time, since these can be run in parallel with the preceding execution of broadcast. (Now,
however, we require an additional round to implement broadcast, since the dealer cannot send its message to all parties
until the preceding execution of broadcast has ﬁnished.) Thus, we obtain an amortized (expected) round complexity of
1+ 6 · 52 = 16 in the unconditional case and 1+ 7 · 4 = 29 in the authenticated case. Applying Lemma 15 to handle the issue
of non-simultaneous termination, we obtain:
• For t < n/3, excepting the ﬁrst invocation of broadcast, each invocation of broadcast incurs an (expected) cost of at
most 3 · 16 + 2 = 50 rounds. (Inspection of Lemma 15 shows that rc(Expandc(pbc))  (2c + 1) · rc(pbc) + c + 1 in the
unauthenticated case.)
• For t < n/2, excepting the ﬁrst invocation of broadcast, each invocation of authenticated broadcast incurs an (expected)
cost of at most 3 · 29+ 3 = 90 rounds.
The round complexity, per broadcast subroutine, when sequential executions of broadcast are used is higher than the round
complexity of a single execution of broadcast. This motivates designing protocols that use only a single round of broadcast;
see [32,33] for work in this direction.
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Appendix A. Additional proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
We show a constant-round gradecast protocol (essentially from [20, Section 5.1]) tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties. The
protocol proceeds as follows:
Round 1. The dealer sends M to all other parties.
Round 2. Let Mi denote the message received by Pi (from the dealer) in the previous round. Pi sends Mi to all the parties.
Round 3. Let M j,i denote the message received by Pi from P j in the previous round. Each party Pi does the following:
if there exists an M∗i such that |{ j : M j,i = M∗i }| 2n/3 then Pi sends this M∗i to all the parties. Otherwise, Pi sends
nothing.
Output determination. Let M∗j,i denote the message (if any) received by Pi from P j in the previous round. Each party Pi
determines its output as follows: if there exists an M∗∗i such that |{ j: M∗j,i = M∗∗i }| 2n/3, then Pi outputs mi := M∗∗i
and gi := 2. Otherwise, if there exists12 an M∗∗i such that |{ j: M∗j,i = M∗∗i }|  n/3, then Pi outputs mi := M∗∗i and
gi := 1. Otherwise, Pi outputs mi :=⊥ and gi := 0.
We prove that the above protocol satisﬁes Deﬁnition 3. Assume ﬁrst that the dealer is honest. Then each honest party Pi
receives Mi = M in round 1 and sends this to all parties in round 2. So in round 3, for each honest Pi it holds that M∗i = M
and so Pi sends this value to all other parties. It follows that any honest party Pi outputs mi = M and gi = 2.
Before proving the second required property, we show that if any two honest parties Pi, P j send a message in round 3
then they in fact send the same message. To see this, say Pi sends M∗i in round 3. Then Pi must have received M
∗
i from at
least 2n/3 parties in round 2, and so strictly more than n/3 honest parties must have sent M∗i in round 2. But this means
that P j receives any value M∗j = M∗i from strictly fewer than n − n/3 = 2n/3 parties in round 2, and so P j either sends M∗i
or nothing in round 3.
Now assume there is an honest party Pi who outputs a message mi and grade gi = 2, and let P j be any other honest
party. Pi must have received mi from at least 2n/3 parties in round 3, and so strictly more than n/3 honest parties sent mi
as their round-3 message. It follows that |{k: M∗k, j =mi}| n/3 and so P j outputs grade g j  1. Say there was an mj =mi
for which |{k: M∗k, j =mj}| n/3. Then at least one honest party sent mj =mi as its round-3 message, contradicting what
was shown in the previous paragraph. So, P j outputs mi as required.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3
The following 4-round VSS protocol, due to [27], tolerates t < n/3 malicious parties. (Recently, 3-round protocols have
also been shown [23,33] but these are not needed to prove the lemma.) The protocol assumes the existence of a broadcast
channel in the sharing phase, but not in the reconstruction phase. Let F be a ﬁnite ﬁeld with s ∈ F, |F| > n, and [n] ⊂ F.
In the description that follows, we implicitly assume that all parties send a properly-formatted message at all times (this is
without loss of generality, as we may interpret an improper or missing message as some default message). When the dealer
is disqualiﬁed this means that execution of the protocol halts, and all honest parties output some default value (0, say) in
the reconstruction phase.
A.2.1. Sharing phase
Round 1. The dealer chooses a random bivariate polynomial F ∈ F[x, y] of degree at most t in each variable with F (0,0) = s.
The dealer sends to Pi the polynomials gi(x)
def= F (x, i) and hi(y) def= F (i, y).
In parallel, each Pi sends a random ri, j ∈ F to each P j (including itself).
Round 2. Pi broadcasts c j,i := gi( j) + r j,i and di, j := hi( j) + ri, j for all j.
Round 3. For each c j,i = d j,i , the following is performed:
• Pi broadcasts a j,i := gi( j).
• P j broadcasts b j,i := h j(i).
• The dealer broadcasts s j,i := F ( j, i).
A party is said to be unhappy if any value he broadcasted in this round does not match the corresponding value
broadcasted by the dealer, and happy otherwise.
12 It will follow from the proof below that at most one such M∗∗i exists in this case.
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b′j,i := h j(i).
End of sharing phase. A party P j who was happy at the beginning of round 4 becomes unhappy if the dealer broadcasted
gi(x) in round 4 such that b′j,i = gi( j). If the number of unhappy parties is now more than t , the dealer is disqualiﬁed.
A.2.2. Reconstruction phase
Round 1. If Pi was happy at the beginning of round 4 of the sharing phase, then Pi sends si := gi(0) to all parties; other-
wise, Pi sends nothing.
Output determination. Party Pi proceeds as follows: if P j was happy at the beginning of round 4 of the sharing phase,
let s j be the value P j sent to Pi in the previous round; otherwise, set s j := g j(0) (where g j(x) is the polynomial
broadcast by the dealer in round 4 of the sharing phase). Let g(y) be the degree-t polynomial resulting from applying
Reed–Solomon error-correction to (s1, s2, . . . , sn). Output g(0).
We ﬁrst prove secrecy. Assume the dealer is honest. After round 1, the information the malicious parties have about
the dealer’s secret s consists of the polynomials sent to the malicious parties by the dealer in round 1 or, equivalently, the
values {F (i, j) | Pi or P j malicious}. We show that in the remainder of the sharing phase the adversary does not obtain any
information about F (i, j) if both Pi, P j are honest; secrecy follows since F is a degree-t bivariate polynomial and there are
at most t malicious parties.
Let Pi, P j be players who remain honest. Round 2 leaks no information about g j(i) = F (i, j) = hi( j) due to the random
pads that are used. Furthermore, ci, j = di, j and so no information about F (i, j) is revealed in round 3. Finally, all honest
parties are happy at the end of the sharing phase and so no information about F (i, j) is revealed in round 4. This completes
the proof of secrecy.
We continue to assume the dealer is honest, and prove validity. As noted above, all honest parties are happy at the end
of the sharing phase and so the dealer is not disqualiﬁed. Furthermore, every honest party sends si = gi(0) = F (0, i) to all
other parties in the reconstruction phase. Since n > 3t and there are at most t “bad” shares in {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, Reed–Solomon
error-correction recovers the polynomial g(y) = F (0, y) and hence all honest parties output g(0) = F (0,0) = s.
Lastly, we prove the reconstruction property. For the case of an honest dealer, this follows from validity. The reconstruc-
tion property is also trivially satisﬁed if the dealer is disqualiﬁed. Thus, in what follows we assume a dishonest dealer who
is not disqualiﬁed.
For any party Pi who remains honest throughout the entire protocol, its “contribution” si in the reconstruction phase
(whether sent in round 1 of the reconstruction phase or automatically set equal to gi(0)) is ﬁxed at the end of the sharing
phase. Furthermore, the vectors (s( j)1 , . . . , s
( j)
n ) and (s
(k)
1 , . . . , s
(k)
n ) used in the output determination step by two honest
parties P j, Pk agree in at least the 2t + 1 positions corresponding to honest parties. If we can show that the values {si |
Pi is honest at the end of the sharing phase} lie on a degree-t (univariate) polynomial, then by the properties of Reed–
Solomon decoding we see that (1) regardless of the adversary’s actions in the reconstruction phase, each honest party will
recover the same g(y) and hence output the same g(0); and furthermore (2) this value g(0) is determined by the joint
view of the honest parties at the end of the sharing phase, as desired.
We will use the following standard claim:
Claim 19. Let x1, x2, . . . , xt+1 be distinct elements in F, and h1(y), . . . ,ht+1(y) be polynomials of degree t. Then there exists a unique
bivariate polynomial F ′(x, y) of degree t in both variables such that F ′(xi, y) = hi(y) for i = 1, . . . , t + 1.
Since the dealer is not disqualiﬁed, there are at least 2t + 1 happy parties at the end of the sharing phase and at least
t + 1 of them are honest. Let H denote the indices of an arbitrary set of t + 1 such parties (so i ∈ H means Pi was happy
and honest at the end of the sharing phase). Let gi(x),hi(y) be the polynomials sent to Pi (for i ∈ H) by the dealer in the
ﬁrst round. By Claim 19, there exists a unique bivariate polynomial F ′(x, y) of degree t such that F ′(i, y) = hi(y) for i ∈ H.
We prove below that for all honest Pi , the contribution si (in the reconstruction phase) will be equal to F ′(0, i) and so the
values {si | Pi honest} lie on the degree-t polynomial F ′(0, y). The reconstruction property follows.
Before continuing, note that (using Claim 19 again) there exists a unique degree-t polynomial F ′′(x, y) such that
F ′′(x, i) = gi(x) for i ∈ H. But then for any i, j ∈ H, we have F ′(i, j) = hi( j) = g j(i) = F ′′(i, j) (using for the second equality
the fact that Pi, P j are happy and honest) and so in fact the bivariate polynomials F ′, F ′′ are identical (since |H| = t + 1).
We now prove that si = F ′(0, i) for all honest parties Pi (whether happy or not):
1. If Pi was happy at the beginning of round 4, then gi( j) = h j(i) = F ′( j, i) for all j ∈ H. Since |H| = t + 1 and the
polynomials gi(x) and F ′(x, i) have degree t , they must be identical and so si
def= gi(0) = F ′(0, i).
2. If Pi was unhappy at the beginning of round 4, let di(x) be the appropriate polynomial broadcasted by the dealer in
round 4. We must have di( j) = h j(i) = F ′( j, i) for all j ∈ H (since P j is happy at the end of the sharing phase). As
before, since di(x) and F ′(x, i) have degree t and agree on t + 1 points, they must be identical and so si def= di(0) =
F ′(0, i).
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We show a constant-round protocol for authenticated VSS which tolerates t < n/2 malicious parties. The protocol as-
sumes a broadcast channel during the sharing phase, but not during the reconstruction phase. Our protocol is adapted from
work of Cramer et al. [14, Section 5] with two modiﬁcations: (1) the protocol of [14] uses “information checking” whereas
we use digital signatures; and (2) the protocol of [14] uses the broadcast channel during the reconstruction phase, and we
avoid this. We now provide the details.
As in the proof of Lemma 3, we assume a ﬁnite ﬁeld F with s ∈ F, |F| > n, and [n] ⊂ F. We continue to assume, without
loss of generality, that parties send properly-formatted messages. If the dealer is disqualiﬁed then execution of the protocol
halts, and all parties output some default value in the reconstruction phase. Finally, we say an ordered sequence of values
(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Fn is t-consistent if there exists a degree-t polynomial f such that f (i) = vi for 1 i  n.
A.3.1. Sharing phase
Round 1. The dealer chooses a random bivariate polynomial F ∈ F[x, y] of degree t in each variable with F (0,0) = s. Let
ai, j = bi, j def= F (i, j). The dealer sends to party Pi the values a1,i, . . . ,an,i and bi,1, . . . ,bi,n , along with a signature on
each such value.13
Round 2. Let ai = (a1,i, . . . ,an,i) and bi = (bi,1, . . . ,bi,n) denote the values received by party Pi in the previous step. If Pi
does not receive a valid signature on all these values as speciﬁed in the previous step, then Pi broadcasts a complaint.
Pi also checks that ai, bi are each t-consistent. If not, Pi broadcasts these values along with the dealer’s signatures on
them; upon receiving such a broadcast from any other party (and verifying the dealer’s signatures and the fact that the
values are not t-consistent), the dealer is disqualiﬁed.
Round 3. If Pi broadcasted a complaint in round 2, the dealer broadcasts ai = (a1,i, . . . ,an,i), bi = (bi,1, . . . ,bi,n), and signa-
tures on each of these values; Pi uses these values for the remainder of the protocol. If the dealer broadcasts incorrect
signatures in response to a complaint, or if any of the broadcasted ai , bi are not t-consistent, the dealer is disqualiﬁed.
Note that unless the dealer is disqualiﬁed at this point, every honest party Pi now has t-consistent vectors ai , bi , and
valid signatures of the dealer on each of {a j,i,bi, j}nj=1.
Round 4. Party Pi computes signature σ j,i on ( j, i,a j,i), and sends (a j,i, σ j,i) to party P j .
Round 5. Pi compares the value ai, j it received from P j in the previous step to the value bi, j it received from the dealer. If
there is an inconsistency, or if P j did not send a valid signature, then Pi broadcasts bi, j and the dealer’s signature on
this value.
Round 6. Pi checks if any party P j broadcasted a value b j,i which is different from the value a j,i that Pi holds. If so, then
Pi broadcasts a j,i and the dealer’s signature on this value.
End of sharing phase. If there exists a pair (i, j) such that ai, j and bi, j were both broadcast with valid signatures of the
dealer and ai, j = bi, j , the dealer is disqualiﬁed.
A.3.2. Reconstruction phase
Round 1. For every j such that Pi has a valid signature σi, j (with respect to the public key of P j) on bi, j , party Pi sends
(bi, j, σi, j) to all other parties. Note that for all other j, party Pi has already broadcasted bi, j (with the dealer’s signature)
in round 5 of the sharing phase.
Output determination. For each 1 j  n, party Pi veriﬁes the signatures on the values received from P j in the previous
round, and disqualiﬁes P j if any of the signatures are invalid.
For each P j which is not yet disqualiﬁed, Pi has values b ji def= (b j,1, . . . ,b j,n) (each of these values was either received
from P j in the previous round or was broadcasted with a valid dealer signature in round 5 or round 6 of the sharing
phase). If b ji is not t-consistent, Pi disqualiﬁes P j .
Let Hi be the set of non-disqualiﬁed parties, from the perspective of Pi . For each j ∈ Hi , party Pi interpolates b ji to
obtain a degree-t polynomial f ′j(y) (recall that b ji is t-consistent). Next, Pi interpolates the { f ′j(y)} j∈Hi to obtain a
bivariate polynomial F ′(x, y) of degree t in both variables (the proof below will show that this is possible). Output
F ′(0,0).
We ﬁrst prove secrecy. If the dealer is honest, no honest party will complain in round 2. Furthermore, if Pi, P j are
honest then ai, j = bi, j in round 5 and so bi, j is not broadcast. It follows that the information malicious parties have about
the dealer’s secret s at the end of the sharing phase consists entirely of the values sent to the dishonest parties by the
dealer in round 1. Secrecy follows since F is a degree-t bivariate polynomial and there are at most t malicious parties.
We next prove validity. It is easy to see that an honest dealer is never disqualiﬁed. Let Pi, P j be parties that remain
honest throughout the entire execution. The vector b ji (in the reconstruction phase) matches the values sent by the dealer
in round 1 and furthermore P j ∈ Hi ; thus, Pi recovers f ′j(y) = F ( j, y) for every honest P j . For any malicious Pk ∈ Hi , the
13 More precisely, the dealer signs the “message” (i, j, F (i, j)).
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round 6), and so bk, j = F (k, j). Since this holds for at least t + 1 honest parties P j and bki is t-consistent (else k /∈ Hi), we
conclude that Pi recovers f ′k(y) = F (k, y) in this case as well. So interpolating the { f ′j(y)} j∈Hi yields F (x, y) (interpolation
can be done since |Hi | t + 1), and the output of Pi is the dealer’s secret F (0,0).
Finally, we prove reconstruction. The case when the dealer is disqualiﬁed is obvious, so assume the dealer is not disqual-
iﬁed.
Let U be the indices of a set of t + 1 parties who are honest at the end of the sharing phase. For honest Pi , letbi = (bi,1, . . . ,bi,n) denote the values that Pi will “effectively” send to other parties in the reconstruction phase (note that
some of these values may, in fact, already have been broadcast). Let f ′i (y) be the result of interpolating bi (this is well-
deﬁned since bi is t-consistent for honest Pi), and let F ′(x, y) be the result of interpolating the f ′i (y) for i ∈ U . We will
show that regardless of the actions of the adversary in the reconstruction phase, each honest party outputs F ′(0,0).
By construction of F ′ , we have bi,k = F ′(i,k) for i ∈ U . We claim that ak,i = F ′(k, i) for i ∈ U . Let g′i(x) be the result of
interpolating ai = (a1,i, . . . ,an,i) (again, this is well-deﬁned since ai is t-consistent for Pi honest). Note that for j ∈ U we
have g′i( j)
def= a j,i = b j,i or else the dealer would have been disqualiﬁed. So g′i(x) agrees with F ′(x, i) on t + 1 points and
hence these polynomials must be identical, proving the claim.
Applying a similar argument (using the fact that, for Pi honest and j ∈ U , we have bi, j = ai, j = F ′(i, j) or else the dealer
is disqualiﬁed), we see that for any honest Pi the vector bi interpolates to f ′i (y) = F ′(i, y). Furthermore, it is easy to see
that if Pi, P j remain honest then Pi ∈ H j . For any corrupted Pk ∈ H j and honest Pi , the value bk,i that Pk sends to P j
in the reconstruction phase was either signed by Pi (in round 4) or broadcast with a valid dealer signature (in round 5 or
round 6), and so bk,i = F ′(k, i). Since this holds for at least t + 1 honest parties Pi and bkj is t-consistent (else k /∈ H j), we
conclude that P j recovers f ′k(y) = F ′(k, y) in this case as well. So interpolating the { f ′i (y)}i∈H j yields F ′(x, y) (interpolation
can be done since |H j | t + 1), and the output of P j is the dealer’s secret F ′(0,0).
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